You guys want to know what I've been doing for my Spring Break? Yeah? Do ya?

This:

(Disclaimer: I don't actually expect ANY of you to read this. Just imagine it going on for, oh, 15 pages...and this is most likely B- work)

(P.S. Disclaimer: If you actually DO read it, the "?"s that are surely showing up are actually little infinity signs)

The Problem of Probability Assignments

It is stated that there is an inverse correlation between probability and cost, and that the possibility of minute probability assigned to theism is problematic as well. Neither of these seems problematic. First one must understand correlation and inverse correlation. Correlation is the connection between two variables. Range can vary, but a range of -1 to +1 is often used. The closer the number is to -1 or +1, the stronger the variables are correlated. A positive correlation means that as one variable increases, so does the other. A reverse correlation means that as one variable increases, the other decreases. There are two ways Morris could be attempting to show reverse correlation.

The first, and less likely, is reverse correlation in each expectation formula separately. In other words, (E) (.999 X 1,000) – 0 = 999, and (E) (.001 X ?) – 1,000 = ? will both fall victim to inverse correlation. For the first (E) to be an example of inverse correlation between probability and cost, .999 rising or falling would mean -0 would need to do the exact opposite. In a game of roulette, a high probability would work well with a high cost because the house would not want to lose money. If the probability fell, the cost could fall too in order to make a more difficult win worth betting for. An inverse correlation would not make too much sense because a rising probability with a lowering cost would mean an easier big win for the one betting. With the Wager, however, a rising probability of there being a God would not mean the cost would drop; in fact that would be counter-intuitive to the original argument against the Wager.

The second, and more probable meaning for Morris, is to show an inverse correlation between betting for God and betting against God. This could obtain, depending on how one looks at it. A rising probability of God existing would not mean a lowering of the cost of atheism. The only way to make this inverse correlation work is by applying it strictly to probability. If the probability of God existing goes up, the probability of God not existing goes down. How is this problematic? Consider the game of roulette, if the probability of betting on black increases, the probability of betting on red decreases. This is not an inverse correlation between probability and cost, as Morris said, but simply an inverse between the probabilities of two opposing bets, which happens in most every situation.

The other problem Morris tries to solve is the concern about the “disparity between the probabilities of theism and atheism.” In other words, according to Morris, betting on theism if it has only a one in a trillion chance of being probable does not seem rational. Following Pascal’s own Wager, however, if the infinite payoff variable is not a problem, as has been shown, the expectation will still be infinity even if the probability is one in a trillion; and the rational gambler will bet on the higher expectation. If one could make a bet in roulette with a one in a trillion probability, but the payoff was infinite happiness (versus a higher probability, but only a finite amount of happiness), rationality points one towards betting on the higher expectation.


somebody kill me